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UNITED STATES (intervenor) 
v. 
AMOS, ET AL. (employees) 
Appeal from U.S.D.C., D. Utah 
(Winder) 
Fed./Civ. Timely 
1. SUMMARY: This case is curve-lined with No. 86-179. 
Please see preliminary memorandum in that case. 
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rom U.S.D.C., D. Utah 
Fed./Civ. Timely 
1. SUMMARY: In these curve-lined appeals, appnts, the 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints ("CPB"), the Corporation of the President of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("COP"), and the 
United States challenge the DC's ruling that §702 of Title VII of 
-13o~ VY\ 1:_ vV\ 0 
.. . 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. §2000e-l is 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. The appnts other than the United States challenge the 
DC's award of damages. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: The CPB and the COP are 
wholly owned by the the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints ("the Mormon Church"). The COP operates Beehive Clothing 
Mills ("Beehive") and the Deseret Gymnasium ("Deseret"). The CPB 
has some administrative input into the running of Beehive and 
Deseret. Beehive manufactures and distributes garments and 
temple clothing. Deseret is a public gymnasium. Four of the 
appees were employed at Beehive and one of the appees, Arthur 
Frank Mayson, was employed at Deseret. All five individuals were 
fired from their jobs solely because they were unable or refused 
to satisfy the Mormon Church worthiness requirements for a 
"temple recommend," a privilege that is accorded to observant 
church members. All five individuals commenced this action 
against the COP and the CPB in the U.S.D.C. for the D. Utah 
(Widner, J.). Appees claimed that the discharges for failure to 
obtain a temple recommend constituted, inter alia, discrimination 
in employment on the basis of religion in violation of 42 u.s.c. 
§2000e-2(a).l The COP and the CPB moved to dismiss the action, 
relying on 42 u.s.c. §2000e-l, which states that Title VII "shall 
lsection 2000e-2(a) (1) bars an employer from "discharg[ing] any 
individual ... because of such individual's religion." 
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not apply ... to a religious corporation 
l 
with r ~ spect to the 
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform 
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation ..• of 
its activities." The DC denied the motion, holding that §2000e-l 
violates the Establishment Clause insofar as it extends to 
secular activities of religious organizations from the provisions 
of Title VII prohibiting religious discrimination. 
As a threshold matter, the court applied a three-part test 
to determine whether the activities at issue in this case were 
"religious." Under this test, a court must look first at the tie 
between the religious organization and the activity. Second, the 
court must examine the nexus between the activity and the 
religious rituals or tenets of the religious organization or 
matters of church administration. If there is a substantial 
connection between the activity and the religious organization's 
religious tenets or matters of church administration and the tie 
under the first part of the test is close, the court does not 
need to proceed any further and may declare the activity 
religious. Otherwise, the court must consider the relationship 
between the nature of the job the employee is performing and the 
religious rituals or tenets of the religious organization or 
matters of church administration. If there is a substantial 
relationship, the court must find that the activity is religious. 
Applying these facts to Deseret, the court concluded that 
there is an intimate connection between Deseret and COP, CPB, and 
the Mormon Church because church officials appoint the members of 
the governing board of Deseret and Deseret has no financial 
' 
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existence independent of the COP. Turning to the second prong of 
the test, the court found that, although the Mormon Church has 
expressed its desire that members of the Church engage in 
physical exercise and has attempted to provide a facility to 
accommodate that desire, the function of Deseret is far from 
closely related to any religious beliefs or tenets of the Mormon 
Church or church administration. In addition, appee Mayson's 
duties are not even tangentially related to any conceivable 
religious belief or ritual of the church or church 
administration. Mayson's job consisted of ordering supplies and 
maintaining equipment, plumbing, and electrical systems. Thus, 
the operation of the gymnasium does not constitute a religious 
activity. Beehive, however, creates a much closer question. 
Although there are facts indicating that Beehive may not be a 
religious activity, further discovery must be conducted to 
supplement the record. 
The court next evaluated whether application of §2000e-l to 
Deseret violates the Establishment Clause, invoking the three-
part test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 
(1971): 
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary ef feet must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion •.. ; 
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.'" 
The court first found that the 1972 Amendment to §2000e-l, which 
extended the exemption to the nonreligious activities of 
religious organizations, was supported by the secular purpose of 
limiting government interference with religious activities. The 
' - 5 - 'I 'l 
' 
legislative goal of assuring that the government remains neutral 
and does not meddle in religious affairs by interfering with the 
decisionmaking process in religions is a valid secular purpose. 
Section 2000e-l, however, fails the second part of the Lemon test 
because the provision has the primary effect of advancing 
religion. If a statute goes beyond the mandates of the Free 
Exercise Clause in accommodating religion, the statute no longer 
maintains the required constitutional neutrality. Moreover, the 
exemption of the secular activities of religious organizations 
from Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination is 
not necessary to avoid excessive government entanglement with 
religion and is not compelled by the Free Exercise Clause. The 
abolition of the governmental exclusion for religious 
organizations' religious discrimination in secular, nonreligious 
activities does not present any conflict with the Free Exercise 
Clause. Consequently, the principle of accommodation espoused in 
Wal z v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 u.s. 664 
(1970), has little relevance here. In fact, abolition of the 
exclusion for nonreligious, secular activities would enhance 
rather than violate the Free Exercise Clause; it would keep 
religious institutions from being permitted to burden the free 
exercise rights of nonmembers who seek employment in nonreligious 
jobs. Moreover, the statute amounts to government sponsorship of 
religion because it allows religious organizations to increase 
their influence over the secular economy and grants religious 
organizations an exclusive authorization to engage in conduct 
that can directly advance religious tenets and practices. With 
~ . 
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regard to the third prong of the Lemon test, the exception 
enables a religious organization to exercise "coercive power" 
over the religious beliefs of its employees. This potential for 
impermissible fostering of religion supports a finding of 
excessive entanglement. On the other hand, §2000e-l does not 
require the type of comprehensive, discriminatory, and continuous 
state or federal surveillance that was condemned in cases such as 
Lemon. Finally, it is not necessary to balance the three Lemon 
factors. Because the direct and immediate effect of the 
exemption is to advance religion, the application of the 
exemptions to the secular activities of religious organizations 
violates the Establishment Clause. 
After this decision was rendered, the appees amended the 
complaint to add a new plaintiff who had been employed at Deseret 
Industries ("Industries"), which is an unincorporated, tax 
exempt, and subsidize~ component of the Mormon Church's welfare 
program. On Sept. 18, 1985, acting on the appees' motion for 
summary judgment, the DC reaffirmed its holding that §2000e-l 
cannot constitutionally be applied to Deseret. The DC denied 
summary judgment with respect to Beehive, stating that there were 
several areas of factual dispute still remaining. The DC also 
entered summary judgment in appnt's favor with regard to 
Industries, which it concluded passed the religious activity 
test. Finally, the DC awarded back wages, fringe benefits, and 
reinstatement to appee Mayson, who had worked for Deseret. In 
Feb. 1986, the DC vacated its judgment and certified the case 
under 28 u.s.c. §2403 to the Attorney General of the United 
. . 
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States and the Attorney General of the State of Utah. In Mar. 
1986, the u.s. intervened in the action. The Utah Attorney 
General declined to intervene or participate as amicus c uriae. 
In May 1986 , the DC enter ed an order and judgment reaf f irm i ng its 
earlier holdings and granting final judgment for Mayson. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appnts CPB and COP assert that the DC's 
decision will effect most, if not all, of the nation's churches. 
On the merits, the DC was incorrect. Congress amended §2000e- l 
in 1972 to make it unnecessary for federal courts in deciding 
employment discrimination cases to distinguish between religious 
and nonreligious activities. The DC has held this amendment 
unconstitutional, creating a new test that requires broad 
scrutiny of the tenets, rituals, and administrative practices of 
religions for the purpose of determining what is and what is not 
"religious." First Amendment values were strengthened, not 
infringed, by the 1972 Amendment. Even assuming that the DC 
should have addressed the Establishment Clause question, the DC 
erred in its wooden application of the Lemon test. As this Court 
has stated, the Lemon test is not a ritualistic checklist. The 
only relevant effect of the 1972 Amendment was to take the 
federal courts out of the business of determining which church 
programs were sufficiently religious and return that test to the 
churches themselves. Since both the purpose and effect of the 
Amendment were to relieve entanglement between church and State, 
it is difficult to see how there could be any serious 
entanglement problem. By contrast, the DC has entangled itself 




The same two appnts also argue that they acted in reliance 
upon an act of Congress in managing the church's affairs. 
Therefore, the sanctions of back wages, other economic damages, 
and r einsta t eme nt to Mayson should not be imposed. This Court 
has determined that damage awards are not mandatory in civil 
rights cases, Carrie v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), but it has 
not had occasion to examine the propriety of such an award 
against an employer that has squarely relied on the clear 
provisions of the statute. 
The United States, through the SG, joins the other appnts in 
arguing that the governmental evaluation of the connection 
between beliefs and activities of religious organizations 
undertaken by the DC is precisely what Congress sought to avoid 
by adopting the broad exemption contained in §2000e-l. Not only 
does the district court's approach require govt to enter 
sensitive areas of religious beliefs, but the threat of 
government review of employment decisions mi gh t inhibit a 
religious group from acting according to its beliefs out of fear 
that hiring decisions based on religion might later be grounds 
for the imposition of liability under Title VII. Thus, Congress' 
decision to allow religious groups to use religion as an 
employment criterion free of govt interference has the legitimate 
effect of accommodating religious institutions and furthering the 
separation of govt and religion. The DC' s determination that 
§2000e-l violates the Establishment Clause appears to rest in 
large part upon its view that a statute that goes beyond what is 
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause in accommodating religion 
- 9 -
il 
sacrifices required constitutional neutrality. 
'I 
This Court has 
never indicated that an accommodation of religion beyond what is 
required by the Free Exercise Clause is likely to contravene the 
Establishment Clause. The court instead has made clear that 
"[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are 
by no means coextensive with the noninterference mandated by the 
Free Exercise Clause." Walz, supra, 397 U.S., at 673. Moreover, 
the DC erred in applying the second step of the Lemon test. 
There is no question that the principal effect of the statute is 
eliminate government interference with religious organizations. 
Thus, as in Walz and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 {1952), the 
effect of the statute is to avoid interference with religious 
institutions, a result that is plainly permissible under the 
Establishment Clause. Finally, Congress' decision to prevent 
any interference with the religious-conscious hiring practices of 
religious organizations is the statutory approach least likely to 
create entanglement between religion and govt. 
In response, appees argue that the DC has decided only that 
§2000e-l is unconstitutional as applied to appnt Mayson's 
employment at the Deseret. Four reasons support summary 
affirmance here. First, this is the first case to hold that 
§2000e-l is unconstitutional as applied. In addition, the 
decision is clearly correct. Third, the DC's conclusion that 
§2000e-l as applied to Mayson is unconstitutional is consistent 
with the conclusion of the other lower courts that have 
considered the issue. See King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 
51 {CADC), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 {1974); Feldstein v. 
- 10 -
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Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974 '1 (D. ·Mass. 1983). 
Fourth, the DC properly weighed the equities in deciding that, 
notwithstanding the corporation's reliance on the permissive 
exemption in §2000e-l, an award of backpay to Mayson was 
appropriate. The court's award is fully consistent with Title 
VII's strong presumption in favor of backpay. Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 u.s. 405, 421 (1975). 
The General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists as amicus 
curiae present essentially the same arguments as appnts. 
4 0 DISCUSSION: It is clear that this Court has 
jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. §1252 to review the DC's final 
judgment concerning the dismissal of Mayson. Appees argument 
that the DC declared §2000e-l unconstitutional only as applied to 
Mayson does not defeat this Court's jurisdiction under §1252. 
See, e.g., Clark v. Gabriel, 393 u.s. 256 (1968) (§1252 
jurisdiction exercised where statute declared unconstitutional as 
applied) . In addition to the relief accorded Mayson, the other 
relevant rulings of the DC are (1) the DC' s denial of summary 
judgment concerning the employees of Beehive: and (2) the DC's 
grant of summary judgment in appnt' s favor with regard to the 
employees of Industries. Appees' seem to suggest that this Court 
does not have jurisdiction to review those rulings. Yet the 
language of the statute and analogous decisions of this Court 
support the conclusion that this Court has jurisdiction to review 
those rulings. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 
468 U.S. 364, 373-374 n. 10 (1984) (stressing the need for 






even before resolution of collateral issues); United States v. 
Locke, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1791 (1985) ("[a]ppeal under §1252 brings 
before the Court not merely the constitutional question decided 
below, but the entire case"); 28 u.s.c. §1252 (" [a]ny party may 
appeal from an interlocutory or final judgment ... ") 
(emphasis added). I do note, however, that I have been unable to 
find a case in which this Court reviewed the denial of a motion 
for summary judgment under §1252 appeal jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Annotation to United States v. Clark, 445 u.s. 23 (1980), in 63 L 
Ed.2d 832 (1980). For this reason, if the Court decides to pursue 
plenary review, the Court may wish to postpone consideration of 
the jurisdictional issue until hearing the case on the merits. 
On the merits, this case is not a likely candidate for 
summary action. First, this Court has recognized that Congress' 
mandate of direct review in §1252 is not to be lightly avoided. 
See, e.g., McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 u.s. 21, 31 (1975). 
Moreover, the issue presented here is of unquestionable 
importance and, as the contentions of the appnts reflect, a 
reasonable argument may be made that the decision below is 
incorrect. In light of this Court's policy to review the "entire 
case" for appeals under §1252, I suggest that the damages issue 
be given plenary consideration as well. 
I recommend: POSTPONE. 
There is a motion to affirm and reply to motion to affirm. 
October 22, 1986 Little Opn in Juris. Statement 
October 31, 1986 
Court .................................. . Voted on .............................. , 19 ..... . 
Argued ................................ , 19 ... .. . Assigned ............ : ................ , 19, .... . 
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ral 10/27/86 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
No. 86-401, United States v. Amos, et al. 
This is a direct appeal, under 28 u.s.c. §1252, from a 
judgment of the DC 
~42 u.s.c. 
(D. Utah, Winder, J.) invalidating §702 of 
§2000e-l, as a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause. Section 702 states that Title VII "shall not apply 
-~ 7{;Ui., tnT{ 
.•. to a religious corporation ... with respect to the employment --------~ 
---·--~~. -- -
cl individuals of a particul~r religion to perform work connected 




by the M~-~urch, 
~
who worked for a Beehive Clothing Mills, 
Deseret Industries, all owned and operated 
were fired because they were not certified ----------- ---------
as Church members in good standing. The DC concluded that the 
- ~0 
d_)gym~~~-~n r -~-~ ~vity, th~Deseret In-
dustries, which is a subsidized ?omponent ~he Church's welfare 
program, is a religious activity, and that further discovery is 
V1 \.) 
necessary to determine whether the clothing mill is a religious 
~-
activity. The DC then applied the test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
u.s. 602, 612-613 (1971). Although §702 has a secular purpose, 
the limitation of government interference with religious activi-
ty, its primary effect is ' to · r~dvan~e religi~1n~The DC concluded J0-C' 
that this "impermissible fostering" of religion by the 
..L t' \. "' 
also supports a finding or excessive entanglement. The DC award-
page 2. 
ed back wages, fringe benefits, and reinstatement to ~he employee 
'I 
who worked at the gymnasium. The DC then vacated i'1ts judgment 
and certified the case to the Attorney General under 28 U.S.C. 
§2403. 
I recommend POSTPONE. This is the first case to hold §702 
unconstitutional. Still, the question is of unusual importance, 
the DC's decision is far from obviously correct, and review under 
§1252 is not to be lightly avoided. There is a jurisdictional 
question: whether the Court has jurisdiction under §1252 to re-
~ew the DC's denial of summary judgment as to the employees of 
Beehive pending further discovery. It is likely that the Court 
has jurisdiction over this denial, because appeal under §1252 
"brings before the Court not merely the constitutional question 
decided below, but the entire case." United States v. Locke, 105 
S. Ct. 1785, 1791 (1985). In reviewing the "entire case," the 
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To: 




r0- t/'VZ(~ . 
~~~~ql.-
~ - ~4~ {Y' z...) 
S- C.- ~~ 5 7 t:J 2 A--L 
BENCH MEMORANDUM ~· 
~~~ 
Justice Powell March 19, 1987 
From: Bob 
Nos. 86-179 & 86-401, The Corporation of the Church of Jesus 
Chirst of Latter-Day Saints, et al. v. Amos, et al. 
United states v. Amos 
Appeal from DC (D. Utah, Winder, J.) 
To be argued Tuesday, March 31, 1987 (2nd case) 
Questions Presented 
1. Does §702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. §200e-
1, that permits religious organizations to discriminate on the 





2. If §702 does violate the Establishment Clause, dia the DC 
abuse its discretion by awarding back pay? 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Deseret Gymnasium (Deseret) is a large non-prof it, tax-
exempt recreational facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. (The 
v(' v- / 
facilities include barber and beauty shops, men's and women's 
./' 
massage salons, and a snack bar that are leased to private, tax-
paying concessionaires.) Deseret is owned and operated by the 
Mormon Church (the Church), is unincorporated, and has no bank 
accounts of its own. It is governed by a board appointed by the 
11 First Presidency 11 of the Church (The 11 First Presidency" 
comprises the President--the ecclesiastical leader of the 
Mormons--and his advisers.) Most of the board members are Church 
officials. Deseret is situated on property owned by the 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop. (The Presiding Bishopric, 
which assists the President, consists of the Presiding Bishop and 
two counselors.) Mormons, in common with other Christians, 
believe that the body is 11 the tabernacle of the Spirit. 11 Blue 
brf. 6. Apparently the Mormon scriptures also teach that, when 
the dead are raised, their souls will be reunited with an eternal 
form of the bodies they acquired on earth. Id., at 7. Prayers 
said at the dedication of Deseret in 1910 stated that its purpose -
is to provide wholesome exercise and recreation under the 
supervision of the Church. Deseret also has secular aspects: It 
\..........- ::::::::-
is open to all members of the public; it 




in the beauty shop and the women's massage salon. Non~ Mormons, 
or Mormons not in good standing, have worked at Deseret over the 
years a~ fueg';,ards, ---;thletic instructors, ......-janitors, and vsnack 
bar attendants. In particular, a member of the famous squash-
playing Khan family has been employed as squash professional and 
manager of the pro shop. (After this action was begun, he 
resigned and was rehired as a 11 contract worker" performing the 
same services.} 
The Church asserts (without discussing the exceptions noted 
~-------
above}, that it employs only Church members in good standing in 
its non-profit activities. As an "administratively convenient 11 
way of identifying those who qualify, the Church requires that 
employees obtain a 14 temple recommend. 11 Temple recommends are 
issued to Church members who observe Mormon requirements such as 
regular church attendance, tithing, and abstinence from alcohol, 
coffee, tea, and tobacco. (A "temple recommend'1 is needed to 
enter Mormon temples, where Mormon religious rituals are 
practiced.} 
Appee Frank Mayson--who never has possessed a temple 
recommend--was employed for 16 years as assistant building 
engineer and building engineer at Deseret. He was reponsible for 
maintining the building, equipment, and grounds. As building 
engineer he supervised a staff of 14 custodians and parking lot 
attendants. In 1980, Mayson was told that he had to obtain a 
tempi e recommend or take early retirement. He refused to do 
either and was discharged. ___ .:::.---
4. 
il 
Mayson--along with several other persons who were discharged 
from employment at Deseret Industries or Beehive Clothing Mills--
filed this action alleging that their discharges constituted 
employment discrimination on the basis of religion in violation 
of 'l'itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s. c. §2000e-
2(a). The statute prohibits an employer from Hdischarg[ing] and 
individual ••• because of such individual's ••. religion.H Ibid. 
The Church moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis ~f 
Title VII, 42 u.s.c. §2000e-l, which provides in part: 
'jThis subchapter shall not apply to a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or 
society with res ect to the em lo ment of indiv \ duals 
of a particular rel1gion to erform wor connectea-with 
the carry1ng on by such corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society of its activities.H 
Ibid. 
The DC held that religious organizations may discriminate on 
~ 
the basis of religion in employing persons to carry on religious 
V\ 
activities. (The DC went on to hold that Deseret Industries, a 
subsidized component of the Church's welfare program, is a 
It ordered further discovery to determine 
whether which manufactures garments worn 
in Mormon temples and other articles, is engaged in religious 
activity. Thus o~ly M-ay-so~ is· before the Court.) The DC 
then applied a 3-part test - of its own invention to determine ----whether an activity is religious or secular. First, it evaluated 
the "tie between religious the religious organization and the 
activity at issue with regard to areas such as financial affairs, 
day-to-day operations and management. 11 J. s. App. lOa. The DC 
concluded that there is Han intimate connection 11 between Desert 
' 'I 
5. 
and the Church. Second, it looked for 11 a clear rel '4tionship 
between the primary function which Desert performs and the 
religious beliefs and tenets of the Mormon Church .••• 11 I d., at 
13a. 
II 
The DC concluded that Deseret serves the same functions as 
gymn~"Although the Mormon Church has expressed 
.~-yr.,...--+-h'-a-t~rs of the of the Mormon Church engage in 
physical exercise and [has] attempted to provide a facility to 
accommodate that desire in an atmosphere which exemplifies its 
beliefs, the function of Desert is far from closely related to 
any religious beliefs or tenets of the Mormon Church or church 
administration. 11 Id., at 16a. Third, the DC inquired into the 
nature of Mayson's job. It concluded that "[n] one of Mayson's 
duties is even tangentially related to any conceivable religious 
belief or ritual of the Mormon Church •••• 11 I d. , at 17 a. The DC 
therefore held that operation of Deseret is a non-religious 
activity. 
The DC proceeded to hold that applying the exemption of §702 
•I \\ 
to secular activities violates the Establishment Clause. The DC 
applied the 3-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 ~ 
(1971}. The DC held that §702 has a per~purpose: ~/--
namely, to 1 imi t government interference with religious 
activities. The DC found no indication that Congress 11 amended 
section 702 for a religious purpose or to promote religion or 
' . 
religious beliefs.-~ J.S. App. 40a. But, the DC held, §702 has 
of advancing religion because it allows 
to increase their role in the secular 
economy and grants them 11 an exclusive authorization to engage in 
6. 
il 
conduct which can directly and immediately advance '~el igious 
tenets and practices. 11 Id., at 70a. The DC placed great weight 
on its conclusions that the exemption is not required under the 
Free Exercise Clause, and is not necessary to avoid excessive 
government entanglement with religion. Finally, the DC held that 
"the potential for impermissible fostering of religion" also 
supports a finding of excessive entanglement. Id., at 74a. The 
DC conceded that §702 does not require comprehensive or 
continuous government surveillance of religion; indeed, the 
purpose of the statute is to avoid such surveillance. The DC 
entered final judgment in favor of Mayson, and ordered that he be 
reinstated with backpay. After the United States intervened, 
filed a brief, and orally argued the constitutionality of §702, 
the DC reaffirmed its judgment. 
I I. DISCUSS ION 
A. Jurisdiction. The Court postponed taking j ur isdict ion 
because of an uncertainty about whether 28 u.s.c. §1252 
authorizes immediate review of the DC's decision to deny summary 
judgment as to the former employees of Beehive Clothing Mills. 
It now appears that the Court need not decide this question. The 
DC entered final judgment for Mayson, and it_s decision clearly 
rests on a holding that §702 is unconstitutional. Thus, the 
Court , clearly has appellate jurisdiction to review the judgment 
for Mayson. If the Court holds that §702 is constitutional, it 
can remand for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 
This may require the DC to grant summary judgment against the 
' 'I 
7. 
other employees, ' f but it will not require this Court to assume 
jurisdiction of the entire action. 
B. Constitutionality of §702. Government accommodation of 
religion is in general a difficult and delicate subject. The 
particular question presented here, however, seems fairly easy. 
I would hold that §702 is constitutional, at least as it is 
applied to a non-profit activity such as Deseret. The only 
---------------------------------------------doubtful question, in my view, is whether the Court should hold 
that §702 is constitutional in all cases, or leave open the 
possibility it is unconstitutional as applied to wholly 
commercial activities for prof it. In addition, some members of 
the Court may wish to abandon the Lemon test in favor of a less 
exacting test that applies to government efforts to accommodate 
religion. As discussed below, I think is a 
helpful and completely adequate 
---------------------~ 1. Statutory Background. As originally enacted in 1964, 
§702 provided an exemption for religious organizations only for 
employees who ~perform[ed] work connected with religious 
activities." 4 2 U • S. C. § 2 0 0 e-1 ( 19 6 4 ) • In 1972, Congress 
expanded the scope of the exemption to all activities of 
religious organizations. There is no serious dispute that the 
purpose of the 1972 amendment was to avoid excessive government 
entanglement with religion. Senator Ervin, a principal sponsor 
of the amendment, stated that a religious exemption 1 imited to 
religious activities "attempted to do an impossible thing, that 
is to separate the religious activities of a religious 
[organization] ••• from those of its activities which can be said 
~- ." . 
8. 
il 
to be not religious, nonreligious, or unreligious. i i 1.118 Cong. 
Rec. 1973 (1972). (Senator Ervin also sponsored an unsuccessful 
amendment to exempt religious organizations from all the anti-
discrimination requirements of Title VII. This broader amendment 
failed, but its failure does not cast doubt on the purpose of the 
narrower exemption for religious discrimination to avoid 
entanglement) • 
2. Constitutional Background. The Court has said that "the 
Constitution ••• affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely 
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. 11 
V' Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 u.s. 668,673 (1984). Moreover, 11 [t]he 
limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no 
means co-extensive w~he non-interference mandated by the Free 
Exercise Clause. 11 ~ v. Tax Commission, 397 u.s. 664, 673 
(1970). Government accommodation of religion aims at a 
"benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to 
exist without sponsorship and without interference • ., Id., at 
699. 
As the SG notes, an explicit exemption from a generally ---applicable government regulation invariably reduces government 
interference with religion, and so furthers an important purpose 
of the Establishment Clause. The Court has approved the basic 
principle of religion-based exemptions grounded on the Free 
Exercise Clause. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 u.s. 205, 234-235 
n. 22 (1972): Sherbert v. Verner, 374 u.s. 398, 409 (1963). The 
Court also has upheld religion-based exemptions against 
Establishment Clause challenge. In zorach v. Clauson, 343 u.s. 
9. 
il 
306 (1952), the Court held that a State may release children from 
public school for classes in religious instruction. In Walz v. 
Tax Commission, supra--a case of particular relevance--the Court 
upheld a property tax exemption for property owned by religious 
organizations and used for religious, educational, or charitable 
purposes. In Gillette v. United States, 401 u.s. 437 (1971), the 
Court upheld the section of the Selective Service Act that 
exempts from military service persons who have conscientious 
religious objections to participating in a war. 
3. Application of the Lemon test. You regard the 3-prong 
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, as one that has "proved useful 
in case after case," and as "the only coherent test a majority of 
"'--- the Court has ever adopted. u Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 u.s. 38, 63 
(1985) (PCMELL, J., concurring). As discussed briefly below, the 
Church and some of the amici urge the Court to to abandon Lemon 
for a less searching scrutiny of government efforts 
accommodate religion based on Walz and Gillette. I think the 
Lemon test is flexible enough to cover government efforts at 
accommodation, and should apply here. 
a. Secular Purpose. Even the DC concluded that reducing 
government entanglement with religion is a permissible purpose. 
The Court has never expressly held that this is a permissible 
purpose under Lemon, but has suggested that it is. See Ansonia 
Board of Education v. Philbrook, No. 85-495 (Nov. 17, 1986) 
(considering employer's duty to accommodate employee's religious 
beliefs imposed by §70l(j) of 'l'itle VII). There is a semantic 




explicitly takes religion into account. But Congress I acted to 
further the ideals of the Framers--that is, to create a climate 
that is equally hospitable to all forms of belief and unbelief. 
Thus, it acted with a fundamentally secular purpose--that is, a 
purpose to protect the secular order set out in the Constitution. 
Moreover, the cases cited above demonstrate that Congress is 
permitted--and to some extent required--to take religion into 
account in enacting laws of general application. 
There is no dispute that Congress is permitted to exempt 
religious organizations from the religious anti-discrimination 
requirement of Title VII in the hiring of clergyman. But members 
~
of a particular religious organization also may view other 
employees as occupying key religious positions, even if non-
members consider their activities wholly secular. (Indeed, they 
may view a cohesive community of believers, or providing 
employment for co-religionists, as central to their religious 
practice.) Distinguishing between religious and secular 
activities thus would require the courts to evaluate a religious 
organization's claims about the dictates of its own religion. If 
churches were uncertain about whether a particular activity would 
be held religious, they might be inclined not to exercise their 
right to consider religion in employment to its full extent. 
For these reasons, I would conclude that the purpose of 
§702--to accommodate religion--is permissible. --
b. Effect. I do not agree with the DC's main conclusion-
~ ~c ~,.~u.f 
-that §702 has the primary effect of advancing religion. It L.C:.., ~ 
tl , 






support, or active involvement in any religious activit~ies. It 
does not prefer one religion over another. This case is not like 
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 u.s. 116 (1982), because it 
does not Hen~esh churches in the exercise of substantial 
government power. 11 459 u.s., at 126. In my view, the principle 
effect of §702 is the one Congress intended: the reduction of 
government entanglement with religion. 
I see no way in which §702 confers a financial advantage on 
religious organizations. Perhaps--to spin a very attenuated 
theory--the religious requirement that employees tithe reduces 
labor costs. But if workers are seeking the highest income, they 
will demand 10 percent higher wages if they are required to give 
back 10 percent to their employer. Even religious employees who 
would tithe in any event are 1 ikely to seek the highest-paying 
job. And if a religious person prefers to work among co-
religionists, even at reduced wages, religious organizations will 
maintain their advantage even without §702 (because only members 
of the organization will be willing to work for reduced wages). 
~ Although the DC did not find that §702 confers any financial ~ 
advantage on religious it did find that §702 
enables religious organizations to 11 expand •• their secular 
activities. It is not clear to me exactly what the DC meant by 
this. If it meant simply that religious organizations would be 
inclined to open more businesses, I fail to see what is wrong 
with that. Surely religious organizations have as much right to 
participate in the economy as anyone else. The DC did raise a 
more disturbing possibility: a religious organizations may be 
12. 
able to coerce individuals into adhering to a religion by 
''! 
offering them a job--or threatening to fire them. There ' are two 
answers to this. First, the DC admitted that this concern is 
•jpurely hypothetical, u and that •jthere is no evidence in this 
case that [the Church is] using or ever would use section 702 to 
further [its] beliefs.u J.S. App. 73a, n. 69. Such hypothetical 
concerns are not sufficient to invalidate an act of Congress. At 
most, the Court should leave open the possibility of an uas 
applied attack" in a future case. 
More fundamentally, I am far from certain that the kind of 
coercion hypothesized by the DC, if it exists, raises a 
constitutional problem. Our history is full of examples of 
religious communities--the theocracies of early colonial New 
~ v V' 
England: the Amish, Mennonites, and Moravians: nineteenth century 
utopian communities such as Oneida: even twentieth century cults. 
These diverse religious organizations share a common belief that 
religion permeates all of life's activities, and that religious 
persons must attempt to build "the City of God" {i.e., a heavenly 
community) on Earth. These religious groups regard all their 
activities as religious, including those that seem purely 
commercial to outsiders. If the exemption from the anti-
discrimination requirements of Title VII were limited to 
"religious activities, u as defined by the federal courts, such 
groups would face an unhappy choice between admitting non-
believers into their commercial activities or sending their 
members to non-religious places of work. Thus, a limited 
exemption would impose a considerable burden on some religions. 
13. 
Moreover, as the SG and the Church argue at lerigth, all r~ligious 
,.1 
organizations would be subject to intrusive oversight by the EEOC 
and federal courts. 
If religious organizations had a monopoly on jobs, the 
coercion problem would be serious--in fact, §702 might then 
violate the Free Exercise Clause. But religious organizations 
have no such power over the labor market, except perhaps in very 
1 irni ted areas. Individuals who do not wish to adopt particular 
religious beliefs or practices are free to take a job with 
another employer--or move to another location to seek work. This 
may be a considerable hardship for some individuals. But the 
'




Finally, as the DC recognized, §702 -does not foster entanglement in the conventional sense. Indeed, 
the DC recognized that the purpose of the statute is to avoid 
entanglement, and I have argued above that it has such an effect. 
uin order to determine whether the government entanglement with 
religion is excessive, [the Court] must examine the character and 
purposes of the institutions that are benfited, the nature of the 
aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship 
between the government and the religious authority. 11 Lemon v. 
Kurtz rna n , 4 0 3 U • S. , at 6 15 • Again, §702 does not provide any 
direct financial aid, and I have argued above that it does not 
give religious organizations an unfair advantage over non-
religious organizations. Most importantly, the statute results 
14. 
in less government interference into religious activitie~. Thus, 
I I 
I see no entanglement problem here. 
4. A Limited Departure from Lemon1 The Church argues that 
the Lemon test should not be applied to legislative efforts to 
accommodate religion, because the effect of such efforts is 
always to "advance 11 religion. But, as the Church itself 
recognizes, the Court's prior decisions have distinguished 
between the primary effect of government action and its secondary 
effects. As argued above, because the primary effect of §702 is 
to avoid government entanglement, it passes the Lemon test. More 
generally, I would adhere to the Lemon test 
5. Exemption for businesses run for profit. Some of the 
law clerks, who are worried about the coercion problem discussed 
above, suggest drawing a constitutional 1 ine between non-profit 
activities and church-owned businesses run for profit. Of 
course, this 1 ine often is drawn for purposes of taxation, and 
there is no doubt that it is constitutionally permissible. My 
own view is that such a distinction is not constitutionally 
required. If you do not agree, or would 1 ike to consider the 
question in a concrete factual situation, the Court could uphold 
the exemption as applied to a non-profit gymnasium while leaving 
open its application to for-profit businesses. (Apparently the 
Mormon Church owns some businesses run for profit, and employees 
of those businesses are hired without regard to religion.) 
c. Award of Backpay. Finally, the Church argues that, even 
if §702 is unconstitutional, it reasonably relied on the plain 
15. 
language of the statute, and so should not b~ assessed ~or back 
'I 
pay. Congress has provided that "no person shall be su'bj ect to 
any liability or punishment for or on account of ••• an unlawful 
employment practice • • • [undertaken] in conformity with and in 
reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of the [EEOC] 
. . . notwithstanding that ••• such interpretation or opinion is 
... determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal 
effect •••• " 42 u.s.c. §2000e-12(b). The Church did not rely on 
a written opinion of the EEOC. Although the Church's reliance on 
the plain language of §702 may have been reasonable, I would not 
extend the "plain language'' of §200e-12(b) beyond opinions of the 
EEOC. The Court has already said that this defense is 'jvery 
narrow," and "[i]t is not for the courts to upset this 
legislative choice to recognize only a narrowly defined • good 
faith' defense. 11 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 u.s. 405, 
423, n. 17 (1975). Moreover, the DC 1 s ruling was not entirely 
unexpected. The constitutionality of amended §702 was questioned 
as early as 197 4. King's Garden, Inc. v. F.C.C., 498 F.2d 51 
(CADC 1974), cert. denied, 419 u.s. 996. Thus, if the Court 
reaches the issue, I am inclined to think the award of back pay 
was not an abuse of discretion. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I apologize for the length of this memo. My recommendation 
is that you vote to REVERSE the judgment of the DC. 
----------------------
.· 
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86-179 
86-401 
Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. AmOf:! 2 ~ 
United States v. Amos .J ~~ 
MEMO TO BOB: 
The DC for the District of Utah invalidated §702 of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 
1972. This section exempts all religious preference 
hiring by religious institutions from the ~prohibition of 
Tile VII against employment discrimination based on 
religion. As an Act of Congress was invalidated , the 
case is here on direct appeal. 
In brief summary, the Mormon Church owns and operates 
the Deseret Gymnasium (the Gym) in Salt Lake City. This is 
an unincorporated church-owned, non-profit gymnasium-type 
facility, operated and subsidized by the church. It has 
neither corporate nor financial existence separate from 
the church, and has no bank account. Its employees are 
hired through the personnel department of the church. The 
property on which the gym is located is exempt from real 
estate taxes by the state on the ground that the premises 
are used exclusively for religious and charitable 
purposes. 
2. 
The purpose of the gym was to provide church members 
with church-supervised exercise and recreation at 
facilities where the church's moral and health standards 
are observed. As I understand it, non-church members are 
also permitted to use the gym just as in most religions 
non-church members are welcome in churches and synagogues. 
The Mormon Church is a little different in this respect. 
The most sacred ceremonies are performed only in Tem2!es, 
and unlike church chapels and meeting houses [that are 
open for public worship] the Temples are open only to 
0 rO ,.......- ........... ....., --
certain eligible members of the church. A member who is 
found to be eligible is given a card called a lJTemple ----,, 
recommend". To be eligible for this card, a member is 
interviewed and investigated to determine whether he or 
she is living in accordance with church doctrine. A 
temple also must observe dietary laws and tithing. 
This case arose when the church fired appellee Mayson 
who was employed as a engineer at the gym, and also fired 
several respondents because they were not eligible for 
Temple cards. These fired employees brought this case in 
DC, and that court - in an 88-page opinion - invalidated 
§702 on the ground that its application to a religious 
organization's secular activities violates the 
f 
3. 
Establishment Clause. In reaching this conclusion, the Q£ 
The court agreed 
that §702 had a valid secular purpose, but it flunked the 
second prong of Lemon because- in the court's view - the 
"primary effect" of §702 was to "advance religion". The 
DC also held that the "entanglement" was excessive, and 
therefore the third prong of Lemon was violated. 
The brief on behalf of appellants by Rex Lee (and 
--A 
several other able lawyers whom I know) emphasizes that 
Congress was faced with a dilemma on the basis of 
experience with Title VII under the Act of 1964. Over its 
eight years of experience with Title VII, serious 
constitutional problems had arisen with respect to 
application of Title VII to churches and other religious 
organizations. The courts were required to draw lines 
between exempted "religious" activities and non-exempted 
"secular" activities, lines extremely difficult to draw. 
As appellants brief puts it: 
"Congress allowed religious institutions to 
engage in religious preference hiring across the 
whole range of their activities, just as they 
had been allowed to do for the first 175 years 
of our Nation's history". 
..... \ 
4. 
Both the SG's brief and appellant's brief in 86-179, 
argue that DC erred applying the in the Lemon test. 
v-
Rather, the most relevant cases are 
Commission, and~llette v. United States. 
Walz v. Tax 
In Waltz this 
Court held that the 1 imits of permissible state 
accommodation of religion are by no means co-extensive 
with the non-interference mandate of the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
Of course, appellees' brief, and particularly the 
brief of the AFL/CIO, strongly support the ruling of the 
DC - adopting for the most part the DC's reliance on and 
analysis of the three-part Lemon test. 
* * * 
This is one of the most important cases to be 
decided this Term. I therefore will want the views of my 
clerk. As I am generally familiar with the religious 
clause cases, I am primarily interested in my clerk's 
analysis. My tentative view is to reverse. The case has 
.. ----
wider ramifications. I believe church property is exempt 
from real estate taxes in every state and locality, and 
churches and religious bodies have other exemptions under 
the Internal Revenue laws. In a sense, all of these 
5. 
could be said to further or promote religion - although 
perhaps not any particular religion. Despite my initial 
view of the case, I want my clerk's independent judgment. 
LFP, JR. 
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CHRISTINE J. ·AMOS ET AL. 
UNITED STATES, APPELLANT 
v. 
CHRISTINE J. AMOS ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
[April -, 1987] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-1, as amended, exempts religious organizations from 
Title VII's prohibition against discrimination in employment 
on the basis of religion. 1 The question presented is whether 
applying the § 702 exemption to the secular activities of reli-
gious organizations violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. The District Court held that it does, and 
' Section 702 provides in relevant part: 
"This subchapter [i. e., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.] shall not apply ... to a religious corporation, asso-
ciation, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment 
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the 
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or so-
ciety of its activities. 
~~ 
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the case is here on direct appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1252. 2 We reverse. 
I 
The Deseret Gymnasium (the Gymnasium) in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, is a nonprofit facility, open to the public, run by 
the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of J e-
sus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB), and the Corporation 
of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (COP). The CPB and the COP are religious entities 
associated with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (the Church), an unincorporated religious association 
sometimes called the Mormon or LDS Church. 3 
Appellee Mayson worked at the Gymnasium for some 16 
years as an assistant building engineer and then building en-
gineer. He was discharged in 1981 because he failed to qual-
ify for a temple recommend, that is, a certificate that he is a 
member of the Church and eligible to attend its temples. 4 
Mayson and others purporting to represent a class of plain-
tiffs brought an action against the CPB and the COP alleging, 
among other things, discrimination on the basis of religion in 
violation of§ 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2. 5 The defendants moved to dismiss this claim on 
2 28 U. S. C. § 1252 permits any party to appeal to this Court from an 
interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United 
States holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action to 
which the United States is a party. 
3 The CPB and the COP are "corporations sole" organized under Utah 
law to perform various activities on behalf of the Church. Both corpora-
tions are tax-exempt, nonprofit religious entities under § 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code. Respondent does not contest that the CPB and 
the COP are religious organizations for purposes of § 702. 
' Temple recommends are issued only to individuals who observe the 
Church's standards in such matters as regular church attendance, tithing, 
and abstinence from coffee, tea , alcohol and tobacco. 
5 The District Court did not certify a class. The other plaintiffs below, 
whose claims are not at issue in this appeal, initially included former em-
ployees of Beehive Clothing Mills, which manufactures garments with reli-
gious significance for Church members. The complaint was amended to 
86-179 & 86-401-0PINION 
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the ground that § 702 shields them from liability. The plain-
tiffs contended that if construed to allow religious employers 
to discriminate on religious grounds in hiring for non-reli-
gious jobs, § 702 violates the Establishment Clause. 
The District Court first considered whether the facts of 
this case require a decision on the plaintiffs' constitutional ar-
gument. Starting from the premise that the religious activi-
ties of religious employers can permissibly be exempted 
under § 702, the court developed a three-part test to deter-
mine whether an activity is religious. 1; Applying t~ test to 
Mayson's situation, the court found: first, that t.dl.Uymna-
sium is intimately connected to the Church financially and-in 
-._,_ 
add as plaintiff a former employee of Deseret Industries, a division of the 
Church's Welfare Services Department. The District Court's rulings on 
the other plaintiffs' claims are described at n. 12, infra. 
6 The District Court described the test as follows: 
"First, the court must look at the tie between the religious organization 
and the activity at issue with regard to such areas as financial affairs, day-
to-day operations and management. Second, whether or not there is a 
close and substantial tie between the two, the court next must examine the 
nexus between the primary function of the activity in question and the reli-
gious rituals or tenets of the religious organization or matters of church ad-
ministration. If there is substantial connection between the activity in 
question and the religious organization's religious tenets or matters of 
church administration and the tie under the first part of the test is close, 
the court does not need to proceed any further and may declare the activity 
religious. . . . However, where the tie between the religious entity and 
activity in question is either close or remote under the first prong of the 
test and the nexus between the primary function of the activity in question 
and the religious tenets or rituals of the religious organization or matters of 
church administration is tenuous or non-existent, the court must engage in 
a third inquiry. It must consider the relationship between the nature of 
the job the employee is performing and the religious rituals or tenets of the 
religious organization or matters of church administration. If there is sub-
stantial relationship between the employee's job and church administration 
or the religious organization's rituals or tenets, the court must find that the 
activity in question is religious. If the relationship is not substantial, the 
activity is not religious." Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 
594 F . Supp. 791, 799 (Utah 1984). 
'· 
86-179 & 86-401-0PINION 
4 CORPORATION OF PRESIDING BISHOP v. AMOS 
matters of management; second, that there ~ clear con-
nection between the primary function which the Gymnasium 
performs and the religious beliefs and tenets of th~rmon 
Church or church administration7; and third, th£t=%0ne of 
Mayson's duties at the Gymnasium are "even tangentially re-
lated to any conceivable religious belief or ritual of the Mor-
mon Church or church administration," Amos v. Corporation 
of the Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791, 802 (Utah). The 
court concluded that Mayson's case involves non-religious 
activity. 8 
The court next considered. the plaintiffs' constitutional 
challenge to § 702. Applying the thr~et out in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), the court first 
heldthat § 702 has the permissible s~ular pur2_9se of "as-
suring that the government remains neutral and does not 
meddle in religious affairs by interfering with the decision-
making process in religions .... " Amos, supra, 594 F. 
Supp, at 812. 9 The court concluded, however, that § 702 
7 The court found that "nothing in the running or purpose of [the Gymna-
sium] . . . suggests that it was intended to spread or teach the religious 
beliefs and doctrine and practices of sacred ritual of the Mormon Church or 
that it was intended to be an integral part of church administration." !d., 
at 800. The court emphasized that no contention was made that the reli-
gious doctrines of the Mormon Church either require religious discrimina-
tion in employment or treat physical exercise as a religious ritual. I d. , at 
801. 
8 The court also considered and rejected the possibility that § 702 could 
be construed to exempt a religious organization only with respect to em-
ployment involving religious activities. !d., at 803-804. 
9 The court examined in considerable detail the legislative history of the 
1972 amendment of§ 702. !d., at 805-812. Prior to that time, § 702 ex-
empted only the religious activities of religious employers from the statu-
tory proscription against religious discrimination in employment. The 
1972 amendment extending the exemption to all activities of religious orga-
nizations was sponsored by Senators Allen and Ervin. Senator Ervin ex-
plained that the purpose of the amendment was to "take the political hands 
of Caesar off of the institutions of God, where they have no place to be." 
118 Cong. Rec. 4502 (1972). 
,: 
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fails the second part of the Lemon test because the provision 
has t e pr1ma:ryeffect of advancing religion. 10 Among the 
considerations mentioned by the court were: that § 702 sin-
gles out religious entities for a benefit, rather than benefiting 
a broad grouping of which religious organizations are only a 
partu; that§ 702 is not supported by long historical tradition12; 
and that § 702 burdens the free exercise rights of employees 
of religious institutions who work in non-religious jobs. 
Finding that § 702 impermissibly sponsors religious organiza-
tions by granting them "an exclusive authorization to engage 
in conduct which can directly and immediately advance reli-
gious tenets and practices," id.·, at 825, the court declared the 
statute unconstitutional as applied to secular activity. The 
court entered summary judgy:nent in favor of Mayson pursu-
ant to FeclerarRWe of Civil Procedure 54(b) and ordered him 
reinstated with backpay. 13 Subsequently, the court vacated 
10 The court rejected the defendants' arguments that § 702 is required 
both by the need to avoid excessive governmental entanglement with reli-
gion and by the Free Exercise Clause. Id., at 814-820. 
11 Cf., e. g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 397 (1983) (provision of 
benefits to a broad spectrum of groups is an important index of secular ef-
fect); Committee for- Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 794 (nar-
rowness of benefited class is an important factor in evaluating whether ef-
fect of a law violates the Establishment Clause). 
12 Cf. Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 
676-679 (1970) (relying in part, in upholding property tax exemption for 
religious groups, on long historical tradition for such exemptions). 
13 The court declared that its determination regarding § 702 "applies with 
equal force to the [similar] state exemption as it relates to the facts of this 
case." Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791, 
798 (Utah 1984). It deferred ruling on the plaintiffs' claim that § 702 vio-
lates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States 
Constitution, id., at 828, and rejected the plaintiffs' state-law claims of 
wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress, id., at 
828-830. 
Subsequently, the court concluded that disputed issues of material fact 
precluded summary judgment for the Beehive employees (see n. 4, supra). 
Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 618 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 
(Utah). 
' I 
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its judgment so that the United States could intervene to de-
fend the constitutionality of § 702. After further briefing 
and argument the court affirmed its prior determination and 
reentered a final judgment for Mayson. 
II 
"This Court has long recognized that the goverl_l_m_Qnt may 
(and sometimes must) ac~mmo~at~ _:eligiou.ura~tices and 
that it may do so without violating the Establishment 
Clause." Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 
-- U. S. :::::::...__, -- (1987) (footnote omitted). It is well-
established, too, that "(t]he limits of permissible state accom-
modation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the 
noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." 
Walz v. Tax Commission, :397 U. S. 664, 673 (1970). There 
is ample room under the Establishment Clause for "benevo- ~ ~ 
lent ne~ hich wnr permit religious exercise tcfexist 
without sponsorship and without interference." I d., at 669. 
At some point, accommodation may devolve into "an unlawful 
fostering of religion," Hobbie, supra, at--, but this is not 
such a case, in our view. 
The private appellants contend that we should not apply 
the three-part Lemon approach, which is assertedly unsuited 
to judging the constitutionality of exemption statutes such as 
A plaintiff added by amendment of the complaint, Ralph Whitaker, 
claimed impermissible religious discrimination in his discharge from the po-
sition of truck driver by Deseret Industries (Industries) based on his fail-
ure to qualify for a temple recommend. Industries, a division of the 
Church's Welfare Services Department, runs a workshop program for the 
handicapped, retarded, and unemployed, who sort and assemble items and 
refurbish donated goods for sale in Industries' thrift stores. Relying on 
the Church's emphasis on charity and work, the court held that Industries 
is a religious activity because "there is an intimate connection between In-
dustries and the defendants and the Mormon Church and between the pri-
mary function oflndustries and the religious tenets of the Church." Id, at 
1027. Finding no Establishment Clause violation in applying the§ 702 ex-
emption to Industries, the court granted summary judgment against 
Whitaker, who did not appeal. 
il ,., 
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§ 702. Brief for Appellants in No. 86-179, at 24-26. The ar-
gument is that an exemption statute will always have the ef-
fect of advancing religion and hence be invalid under the sec-
ond ("effects") part of the Lemon test, a result claimed to be 
inconsistent with cases such as W alz v. Tax Com mission, 397 
U. S. 664 (1970), which upheld property tax exemptions for 
religious organizations. The first two of the three Lemon 
factors, however, were directly taken from pre-Walz deci-
sions, 403 U. S., at 612-613, and Walz did not urport to..de-
part from rior Establishment Clauseca"Ses, except by add-
i g a consideration tnat became lletl1ird element of the 
Lemon test. I d., at 613. In any event, we need not re-
examine Lemon as applied in this context, for the exemption 
involved here is in no way uestionable under tlleremon 
ana ys1s. 
Lemon requires first that the law at issue serve a "secular 
legislative purpose." 403 U. S., at 612. This does not mean 
that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion-that 
would amount to a requirement "that the government show a 
callous indifference to religious groups," Zorach v. Clauson, 
343 U. S. 306, 314 (1952), and the Establishment Clause has 
never been so interpreted. Rather, Lemon's "p!!!J).Qse" re-
quirement aims at JJreventing the relevant governmental 
decisionmakffinthls case, ongress- rom abandoning 
neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particu-
lar pmnt of view ~n religious matters. · 
Under the Lemon analysis, it is a permissible legislative 
purpose to "alrev1ate Significant governmenta interference 
withffie ability of religious organizations to define and carry 
out their religious missions. Appellee argues there is no 
such purpose here because § 702 provided adequate protec-
tion for religious employers prior to the 1972 amendment, 
when it exempted only the religious activities of such employ-
ers from the statutory ban on religious discrimination. We 
may assume for the sake of argument that the pre-1972 ex-
emption was adequate in the sense that the Free Exercise 
?? 
86-179 & 86-401-0PINION 
8 CORPORATION OF PRESIDING BISHOP v. AMOS 
Clause required no more. Nonetheless, it is a significant 
burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of 
substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular 
court will consider religious. The line is hardly a bright one, 
and an organization might understandably be concerned that 
a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of 
mission. 14 Fear of potential liability might affect the way an 
organization carried out what tt-uhderstood to be its religious 
mission. 
After a detailed examination of the legislative history of 
the 1972 amendment, the District Court concluded that Con- J 
gress' pur ose was to minimize governmental "interfer(ence] 
with the decision-making process in religion." Amos, supra, 
594 F . Supp., at 812. We agree with the District Court that 
' 'thi~REse~ does not violatetileEstablishment Clause. 
The second requirement under Lemon is tnat the law in 
question have "a principal or primary effect ... that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion." 403 U. S., at 612. Un-
doubtedly, religious organizations are better able now to ad-
vance their purposes than they were prior to the 1972 amend-
ment to § 702. But religious groups have been better able to 
advance their purposes on account of many laws that have 
passed constitutional muster: for example, the property tax 
exemption at issue in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 
664 (1970), or the loans of school books to school children, in-
cluding parochial school students, upheld in Board of Educa-
tion v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). A law is not unconstitu-
tional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, 
which 1st e1r very purpose. For a law to have-ro;bidden 
"effects" under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the govern-
14 The present case is illustrative of the difficulties: the distinction be-
tween Deseret Industries, see n. 12, supra, and the Gymnasium is rather 
fine. Both activities are run on a nonprofit basis, and the CPB and the 
COP argue that the District Court failed to appreciate that the Gymnasium 
as well as Deseret Industries is expressive of the Church's religious values. 
Brief for Appellants in No. 179, at 6-8, 19. 
; .. ·~ . 
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ment itself has advanced religion through its own activities 
and influence. As the Court observed in Walz, supra, 
"[F]or the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted spon-
sorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sov-
ereign in religious activity." 397 U. S., at 668. Accord, 
Lemon, supra, 403 U. S., at 612. 
The District Court appeared to fear that sustaining the ex-
emption would permit churches with financial resources im-
permissibly to extend their influence and propagate their 
faith by entering the commercial, profit-making world. 
Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 
791, 825 (Utah 1984). The Gymnasium, however, is a non-
profit activity instituted over 75 years ago in the hope that 
"all who assemble ere, and who come here for the benefit of 
their health, and for physical blessings, [may] feel that they 
are in a house dedicated to the Lord." Dedicatory Prayer 
for the Gymnasium, quoted at Amos v. Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791, 800-801, n. 15. More-
over, we find no persuasive evidence in the record before us 
that the Church's ability to propagate its religious doctrine 
through the Gymnasium is any greater now than it was prior 
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. In such cir-
cumstances, we do not see how any advancement of religion 
achieved by the 'GymnasiUm canoe 'Iairly attributed to the 
Government, as opposed to thecnurch. 15 
15 Undoubtedly, appell~e's freedom of choice in religious matters was im-
pinged upon, but it was the Church (t~rough the COP and the CPB), and 
not the Government,WilO put him to the choice of changing his religiOu.s 
practice~ his joo:- TliiS1s a very different case than Estate of 
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc ., 472 U. S. 703 (1975). In Caldor, the Court 
struck down a Connecticut statute prohibiting an employer from requiring 
an employee to work on a day designated by the employee as his Sabbath. 
In effect, Connecticut had given the force of law to the employee's designa-
tion of a Sabbath day and required accommodation by the employer regard-
less of the burden which that constituted for the employer or other employ-
ees. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, - U. S. 
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We d un ersuasive the District Court's reliance on the 
fact that § 702 sin l'es out religious entities for a benefit. Al-
though the COurt1iaSgivenweigbttcrt~onsideration in its 
past decisions, see n. 10, supra, it has never indicated that 
statutes that give special consideration to religious groups 
are per se invalid. That would run contrary to the teaching 
of our cases that there is ample room for accommodation of 
religion under the Establishment Clause. See supra, at 
Where, as here, government acts with the proper 
purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of re-
ligion, we see no reason to require that the exemption come 
packaged with benefits to secular entities. 
We are also unpersuaded by the District Court's reliance 
on the argument that § 702 is unsupported by long historical 
tradition. There was simply no need to consider the scope of 
the § 702 exemption until the 1964 Civil Rights Act was 
passed, and the fact that Congress concluded after eight 
years that the original exemption· was unnecessarily narrow 
is a decision entitled to deference, not suspicion. 
Appellee argues that § 702 offends Equal Protection princi-
ples by giving less protection to the employees of religious 
employers than to the employees of secular employers. 16 
Appellee relies on Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 246 
(1982), for the proposition that a law drawing distinctions on 
religious grounds must be strictly scrutinized. But Larson 
indicates that laws discriminating among religions are sub-
-, -, n. 11 (1986). In the present case, appellee was not legally obli-
gated to take the steps necessary to qualify for a temple recommend, and 
his discharge was not required by statute. We find no merit in appellee's 
contention that § 702 "impermissibly delegates governmental power to reli-
gious employees and conveys a message of governmental endorsement of 
religious discrimination.' ' Brief for Appellee 31. 
16 Appellee also argues that § 702 violates Equal Protection principles by 
giving religious employers greater leeway to discriminate than secular em-
ployers. It is not clear why appellee should have standing to represent 
the interests of secular employers, but in any event this argument is , prac-
tically speaking, merely a restatement of the first point. 
.. 
86-179 & 86-401-0PINION 
CORPORATION OF PRESIDING BISHOP v. AMOS 11 
ject to strict scrutiny, ibid., and that laws "affording a uni-
form benefit to all religions" should be analyzed under 
Lemon, id., at 252. In a case such as this, where a statute is 
neutral on its face and motivated by a permissible purpose of 
limiting governmental interference with the exercise of reli-
gion, we see no justification for applying strict scrutiny to a 
statute that passes the Lemon test. The proper inquiry is 
whether Congress has chosen a rational classification to fur-
ther a legitimate end. We have already indicated that Con-
gress acted with a legitimate purpose in expanding the § 702 
exemption to cover all activities of religious employers. 
Supra, at --. To dispose of appellee's Equal Protection 
argument, it suffices to hold-as we now do-that as applied 
to the nonprofit activities of religious employers, § 702 is ra-
tionally related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating sig-
nificant governmental interference with the ability of reli-
gious organizations to define and carry out their religious 
missions. ~ 61,_..... ~h.~ 
It cannot be seriously contended that § 702 impermissibly ~ ~f.cvv-r -::-~- . ,... 
entangles church and state; the effect of the statute is to ef-
fect a more complete separation of the two, and to avoid the 
kind of intrusive inquiry into religious belief that the District 
Court engaged in in this case. The statute easily passes 
muster under the third part of the Lemon test. 17 
17 We have no occasion to pass on the argument of the COP and the CPB 
that the exemption to which they are entitled under § 702 is required by 
the Free Exercise Clause. 
Appellee argues that § 702 creates danger of political divisiveness along 
political lines. As the Court stated in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 
684 (1984): 
"[T]his Court has not held that political divisiveness alone can serve to in-
validate otherwise permissible conduct. And we decline to so hold today. 
This case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-sponsored schools or 
colleges, or other religious institutions, and hence no inquiry into political 
divisiveness is even called for, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 403-404, 
n. 11 (1983)." 
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The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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